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SOUTH CAROLINA'S SEXUAL CONDUCT LAWS AFTER LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
I. INTRODUCTION
State laws proscribing consensual sexual conduct between adults are
unconstitutional because they violate substantive due process. Moreover, such
laws are "uncommonly silly"1 as a practical matter because they purport to
criminalize conduct that many individuals engage in, and they are rarely
2 3enforced. However, South Carolina has several such laws, and given the
Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas,4 which held that the
understanding of liberty under the Due Process Clause gives consenting adults
the right to engage in private sexual conduct without government intervention,5
South Carolina has no legitimate interest in keeping its archaic antifornication
laws on the books.
South Carolina has several criminal statutes proscribing consensual private6
sexual conduct between adults in its statutory code. These provisions are part of
Chapter 15 of Title 16 of the South Carolina Code, which delineates "Offenses
Against Morality and Decency" and provides that any conduct constituting
fornication, adultery, or buggery is punishable as a criminal offense.7 The South
Carolina Code defines fornication as "the living together and carnal intercourse
with each other or habitual carnal intercourse with each other without living
together of a man and woman, both being unmarried." 8 The offense of adultery
mirrors that of fornication, with the only significant difference being that one or
both partners must be lawfully married to another person.9 Both offenses carry
the same punishment upon conviction-offenders "shall be severally punished
by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars
or imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than one year or by both
fine and imprisonment." 10 While the statutory language describing the separate
offense of buggery is facially ambiguous,11 the word buggery is widely
understood to encompass the criminal act of sodomy.12 South Carolina's
criminal law punishes those found guilty of buggery more severely than those
1. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2. See id. ("As a practical matter, the law [forbidding the use of contraceptives] is obviously
unenforceable ... ").
3. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2003) (describing penalties for adultery and fornication
offenses); id. § 16-15-70 (defining adultery); id. § 16-15-80 (defining fornication); id. § 16-15-120
(describing the penalty for buggery).
4. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5. Id. at 578.
6. See §§ 16-15-60,-70,-80.
7. See id. §§ 16-15-60, -70, -80, -120.
8. Id. § 16-15-80.
9. Compare id. § 16-15-80 (defining fornication), with id. § 16-15-70 (defining adultery).
10. Id. § 16-15-60.
11. Section 16-15-120 provides that "the abominable crime of buggery" is a criminal offense
in South Carolina, but it does not specify what conduct constitutes "buggery."
12. See 70c AM. JUR. 2D Sodomy §§ 2, 3 (2010).
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convicted of fornication or adultery-a convicted offender is "guilty of [a]
felony and shall be imprisoned in the Penitentiary for five years or shall pay a
fine of not less than five hundred dollars, or both., 13 For all of these offenses
regarding prohibited sexual activity, the imposition of punishment is within the
discretion of the sentencing court.14 In addition to the possibility of the
punishments provided in Chapter 15, individuals convicted of fornication,
adultery, or buggery may face a number of indirect consequences, particularly
with respect to their ability to work with children in the future. Persons convicted
of adultey or fornication under section 16-15-60 may be ineligible to work as
teachers, 1 may not serve as guardians ad litem,
16 mat not be foster parents,
17
may not work at a day-care or child-care facility, and may not work as
employees of the Department of Social Services in the child protective services
or day care licensing divisions. 19 In addition to these consequences, individuals
convicted of buggery are considered felons and may be subject to other serious
repercussions, including mandatory HIV testing and compulsory registration as
sex offenders.20 Thus, as with any criminal conviction, these offenses carry with
them the possibility not only of direct punishment but also of serious indirect
social consequences and stigma that may last long after offenders serve their
sentences.
Consistent with a federalist system of government, the United States
Constitution provides that the powers not expressly granted to the federal
government nor prohibited to the states are reserved to the individual states and
the people. 1 Within their borders, states exercise their police powers to promote
the welfare, security, health, and safety of their citizens. Exercising their police
powers, states use the criminal law to punish and deter conduct that the
13. § 16-15-120.
14. See id. §§ 16-15-60, -120.
15. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-26-40(M) (2004).
16. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-11-520 (2010).
17. See id. §63-7-2350(A)(2)(b).
18. See id. §§ 63-13-620 to -630, -820, -1010.
19. See id. §63-13-190.
20. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-740 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430 (2007); see also S.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-3-400 (2007) ("The sex offender registry will provide law enforcement with the
tools needed in investigating criminal offenses. Statistics show that sex offenders often pose a high
risk of re-offending. Additionally, law enforcement's efforts to protect communities, conduct
investigations, and apprehend offenders who commit sex offenses are impaired by the lack of
information about these convicted offenders who live within the law enforcement agency's
jurisdiction.").
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
22. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("There are ... certain powers,
existing in the sovereignty of each State in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the
exact description and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those powers,
broadly stated and without, at present, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the safety,
health, morals and general welfare of the public."), overruled by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
[VOL. 61 : 799
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legislature finds "most egregious to the public weal. 23 The criminal law seeks to
accomplish the general goal of deterrence through the complementary goal of
punishment.24 In theory, the State punishes individual offenders for their
transgressions, and in doing so, both deters those particular individuals from
future misconduct and generally deters society, which learns from the mistakes
of others.2 5 However, society, acting through its elected representatives, may not
arbitrarily choose to criminalize whatever conduct it wishes, because the
Constitution removes certain issues from the realm of political debate and places
26restrictions on the government's power. Because certain liberties are so
fundamental, they are not subject to the whims of the majority.27 While the text
of the Constitution expressly protects some of these fundamental rights, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to include some rights not specifically mentioned in the text of the
Constitution but nevertheless deemed to be fundamental under the doctrine of
substantive due process.2 8 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court found that a Texas
law criminalizing consensual homosexual sodomy violated the right to privacy,
which is a subset of substantive due process. 29 This Note will show how, in the
wake of the Lawrence decision, South Carolina's criminal laws proscribing
private consensual adult sexual activity are unconstitutional because they intrude
into a constitutionally protected zone of individual liberty.
Part II of this Note will discuss Supreme Court decisions establishing and
expanding the idea of a constitutional right to privacy protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Part III will explain the Court's decision in Lawrence
and its reliance upon the right to privacy when it overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick,3° concluding that "the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the
23. Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced"
Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103, 105 (2000).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not mary, a person of another race resides with
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."); see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (striking down a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance as impermissibly vague
because it did not give fair notice of prohibited behavior and resulted in arbitrary arrests).
27. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
("In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of
their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the 'traditions and [collective]
conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked
as fundamental.' The inquiry is whether a right involved 'is of such a character that it cannot be
denied without violating those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions" . . . .- (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932))).
28. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-49 (1992) (describing
how substantive due process protects liberties that are not enumerated in the Constitution).
29. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
30. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
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private conduct [homosexual sodomy] in the exercise of their liberty under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."" Part IV
will address the State's interests in criminalizing certain types of private sexual
conduct. Part V will argue that, as a general matter, states should not impose a
moral code onto society by legislating morality, and it will also focus on the
practical problems related to laws proscribing noncommercial private consensual
adult sexual conduct. Part VI will examine the experience of other states, where
either the legislature has voluntarily repealed fornication and sodomy statutes or
the highest court of the state has struck down the law as antithetical to the state
constitution. In particular, Part VI will focus on Martin v. Ziherl,32 a Virginia
Supreme Court case that relied on the Lawrence decision in overturning its own
antifornication statute.33 Finally, Part VII will address the concerns of the
Lawrence dissenters and distinguish laws proscribing private consensual adult
sexual conduct from other laws regulating sexual behavior. In particular, Part
VII will argue that while antifornication laws and some applications of
antisodomy laws cannot be sustained following the Lawrence decision, South
Carolina may maintain other laws regulating sexual behavior, including adultery
laws.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL "RIGHT TO PRIVACY"
While some state constitutions explicitly grant citizens a right to privacy,
34
the federal constitution does not; nonetheless, the Supreme Court has found such
a right to exist based on other constitutional provisions.35 In particular, the right
to privacy often appears in the context of Fourth Amendment search and seizure36 37
cases. In Olmstead v. United States, Justice Louis Brandeis's dissenting
opinion argued that the Fourth Amendment protects an individual's right to
privacy, into which the government had impermissibly intruded.38 In Katz v.
United States,39 which overruled Olmstead, the Supreme Court agreed:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
31. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
32. 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005).
33. Id. at 371 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577).
34. See Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 121 (Mont. 1997) ("[W]e have long held that
Montana's Constitution affords citizens broader protection of their right to privacy than does the
federal constitution. Unlike the federal constitution, Montana's Constitution explicitly grants to all
Montana citizens the right to individual privacy." (citation omitted)).
35. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
36. See Gryczan, 924 P.2d at 121.
37. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
38. Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
39. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
[VOL. 61 : 799
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is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.40
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz also discussed the right to
privacy and framed the test for determining whether law enforcement officials
had violated the Fourth Amendment.4 1 A search by law enforcement implicates
an individual's Fourth Amendment rights where an individual had "an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy" and where the individual's expectation was
"one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ' 42
In addition to being a part of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the right to privacy is a component of the Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine of substantive due process.43 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that states shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 4 While this language appears to place
only procedural limitations on state power, during two key periods, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to convey substantive rights as
well. a5 During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Lochner era,46 the Supreme
Court "interpreted the [Due Process Clause] as guaranteeing various laissez-faire
economic freedoms, particularly the freedom of contract., 47 The Court also
expanded the substantive due process doctrine beyond the context of economic
freedoms during the second half of the twentieth century, when it recognized a
constitutional right to privacy.48 Tracing the evolution of the concept of the right
to privacy in specific Supreme Court decisions is informative and helps illustrate
how the Court's Lawrence decision in 2003 was a natural continuation of its
right-to-privacy jurisprudence.
40. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
41. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. Id.
43. Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy" Law: An
Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social issues, 51 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 81 (1988).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
45. Schneider, supra note 43, at 81.
46. Id. at 81 n.5.
47. Id. at 81. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the Supreme Court first
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to provide substantive protections to
private contracts. See id. at 591-93. The Lochner decision extended this early case's reasoning and
expressly held that the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed the right to make a business contract
and the right to buy and sell labor. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (citing Allgeyer,
165 U.S. 578), overruled by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
48. Schneider, supra note 43, at 81.
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A. Protection of Marriage
The right to privacy under the doctrine of substantive due process most often
appears in cases involving freedom of choice in matters that involve
reproduction, contraception, abortion, and marriage.49 The Supreme Court first
recognized that individuals have a constitutionally protected fundamental right to
marry the person of their choice in Loving v. Virginia.50 There, the Court struck
down a state miscegenation statute that prohibited members of different races
from marrying.51 Additionally, in Zablocki v. Redhail,52 the Supreme Court
stated, "[T]he right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the
classification at issue here significantly interferes with the exercise of that right,
we believe that 'critical examination' of the state interests advanced in support of
the classification is required., 53 The Court in Zablocki held that a state law that
provided that individuals who were under an obligation to pay child support
could not marry without court approval was an impermissible restriction on
one's right to marry.54 These cases, along with others examining the right to
marry,55 indicate that "the right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right of
privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 56
Additionally, other cases have recognized that substantive due process
encompasses a right to family unity.57
49. See Burton v. York County Sheriffs Dep't, 358 S.C. 339, 353-54, 594 S.E.2d 888, 896
(Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]he 'right to privacy' has come to mean a right to engage in certain highly
personal activities. More specifically, it currently relates to certain rights of freedom of choice in
marital, sexual, and reproductive matters. Even this definition may be too broad... [because] the
Justices have acknowledged the existence of a 'right' and defined it by very specific application to
laws relating to reproduction, contraception, abortion, and marriage." (quoting 3 RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 18.26 (3d ed. 1999))); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) ("[T]he
right has some extension to activities relating to marriage procreation; contraception; family
relationships; and child rearing and education." (citations omitted)).
50. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
51. Id.
52. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
53. Id. at 383 (citing Mass. Bd. ofRet. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1976)).
54. Id. at 387-91.
55. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing marriage as
"fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (recognizing that the Due Process Clause protects the right "to marry, establish a home
and bring up children"); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (characterizing marriage as "the
foundation of the family and of society").
56. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
57. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-96, 506 (1977) (holding that
a city housing ordinance was an unconstitutional violation of due process where it criminalized a
grandmother for living with her extended family); see also id. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[T]he ordinance unconstitutionally abridges the 'freedom of personal choice in matters of...
family life [that] is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
[VOL. 61 : 799
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B. Protection of Reproductive Matters
In Griswold v. Connecticut,58 a case involving whether the State could
restrict a married couple's access to contraceptives, the Supreme Court held that
individual decisions by married people concerning their own intimate physical
relationships are a facet of the right to privacy.59 The Supreme Court extended
Griswold's holding in Eisenstadt v. Baird60 and recognized the right of
unmarried persons to have access to contraceptive devices. 61 While the Court
reached its decision by reasoning that the statute in question violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it provided dissimilar
treatment for married and unmarried persons who were similarly situated,62 the
decision is significant for recognizing that rights pertaining to procreation extend
beyond the marital unit. The Court explicitly stated the following:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart
of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
63affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
This line of decisions thus establishes that while the right to privacy is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution's text, it is a fundamental right worthy
of protection in the context of such highly personal and intimate matters as
64marriage and family autonomy.
C. Protection ofAbortion
The Supreme Court further extended the right to privacy under substantive
65due process in Roe v. Wade, where the Court held that the right "is broadenough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
Amendment."' (second alteration in original) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639-40 (1974))).
58. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
59. Id. at 484-86.
60. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
61. Id. at 453.
62. Id. at 454-55.
63. Id. at 453.
64. The Court has also found a fundamental right to privacy in cases involving government
intrusion into the home. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("For also fundamental is
the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions
into one's privacy."). The right to privacy has also been described as "the right to be let alone."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
65. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2010]
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pregnancy."'66 The Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey67 reaffirmed the central holding of Roe-that prior to fetal
viability, a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion. However, at the
same time the Court also recognized that the State does have a legitimate interest
in both the health of the mother and the potential life of the unborn fetus. 69 As to
the right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said, "It
is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter., 70 While recognizing a right to privacy under the
doctrine of substantive due process has been criticized at times, 71 it is clear that
within the spheres of marriage, reproductive matters, and abortion, the Supreme
Court is willing to acknowledge and protect such a right.
III. THE LAWRENCE V. TEXAS DECISION: OVERRULING BOWERS V. HARDWICK
The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence was a logical extension of the
earlier line of cases finding a right to privacy implicit within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion struck down a
Texas law proscribing private consensual homosexual sodomy between adults as
72an unconstitutional infringement on the right to privacy. As discussed above,
the Supreme Court had traditionally invoked the right to privacy in the context of
family matters and reproductive autonomy,73 which led some to criticize the
Lawrence decision as a departure from stare decisis and precedent. 74 Because the
66. Id. at 153.
67. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
68. Id. at 846.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 847.
71. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605-06 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I
can find [neither in the Bill of Rights nor any other part of the Constitution a] general right of
privacy."' (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)));
id. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no right to 'liberty' under the Due Process Clause
...."). But see Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("It is of the very nature of a free society
to advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living
principle, due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be
deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.").
72. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
73. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S.
558.
74. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[O]nly fundamental rights which
are deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition qualify for anything other than rational-basis
scrutiny under the doctrine of substantive due process." (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion persuasively addresses this criticism:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment
or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold
possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this
insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
[VOL. 61 : 799
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Court has protected privacy with regard to reproductive matters, which often
involves some third party,75 it would seem logical that the right to privacy would
also encompass consensual sexual activity between adults when such activity
occurs within the privacy of the home, which is an area clearly protected by the
76Constitution.
In Bowers, the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing
sodomy, noting that "respondent would have us announce ...a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do. 77
Justice White's majority opinion, however, was met by sharp dissenting
opinions. Quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &S78
Gynecologists, Justice Blackmun noted, "'Our cases long have recognized that
the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual
liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government."', 79 For Justice
Blackmun, this sphere of individual liberty encompassed precisely the kind of
conduct that the State of Georgia had criminally proscribed.80 Additionally,
Justice Stevens argued in dissent that cases prior to Bowers established the
proposition that "individual decisions by married persons, concerning the
intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for
greater freedom.
Id. at 578-79 (majority opinion).
75. With regard to both accessing contraceptive devices and obtaining abortions, a doctor or
medical care provider is often involved.
76. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that police use of thermal
imaging to detect evidence of a defendant illegally growing marijuana in his home is a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes and, as such, is presumptively unreasonable without a search warrant);
see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The behavior for which Hardwick
faces prosecution occurred in his own home, a place to which the Fourth Amendment attaches
special significance .... Just as the right to privacy is more than the mere aggregation of a number
of entitlements to engage in specific behavior, so too, protecting the physical integrity of the home
is more than merely a means of protecting specific activities that often take place there."), overruled
by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("[T]he essence of a Fourth Amendment violation is 'not the breaking of [a person's] doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers,' but rather is 'the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property."' (second alteration in original) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))).
77. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. The Court also noted that "[n]o connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated .... Moreover, any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that
any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state
proscription is unsupportable." Id.
78. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
79. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at
772).
80. See id. at 199-200 (citing Herring v. State, 46 S.E. 876, 882 (Ga. 1904)). Justice
Blackmun also stated, "[T]he right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy
of his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy." Id
at 208.
2010]
9
Hagood: South Carolina's Sexual Conduct Law after Lawrence v. Texas
Published by Scholar Commons, 2010
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment., 81 For him, the logical implications of the Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence in decisions such as Griswold and
Eisenstadt dictated that the right of privacy also encompassed the conduct
prohibited by Georgia's statute. 2 In overruling the Bowers decision, Justice
Kennedy's Lawrence opinion expressly stated, "Justice Stevens' analysis, in our
view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here. Bowers
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. 8 3
IV. STATE INTERESTS N REGULATING SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
States may not enact statutory classifications that are arbitrary or capricious;
that is, there must at least be some reasonable justification or basis for
rulemaking. 4 With regard to criminal law, a state's justifications are particularly
important because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving
citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,8 5 and it is
precisely when the State exacts punishment through criminal sanctions that the
greatest individual deprivations occur-deprivation of property through fines,
deprivation of liberty through imprisonment, and possible deprivation of life
through capital punishment. In order to survive a due process challenge to one of
its criminal laws, the State at a minimum must be able to assert a legitimate
81. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
Before his appointment to the Supreme Court, in Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d
716 (7th Cir. 1975), Justice Stevens observed the following with respect to cases dealing with
claims similar to that in Bowers:
They deal ... with the individual's right to make certain unusually important decisions
that will affect his own, or his family's, destiny. The Court has referred to such decisions
as implicating "basic values," as being "fundamental," and as being dignified by history
and tradition. The character of the Court's language in these cases brings to mind the
origins of the American heritage of freedom-the abiding interest in individual liberty
that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen's right to decide how he will live his
own life intolerable. Guided by history, our tradition of respect for the dignity of
individual choice in matters of conscience and the restraints implicit in the federal
system, federal judges have accepted the responsibility for recognition and protection of
these rights in appropriate cases.
Id. at 719-20 (footnotes omitted).
82. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see also id. ("The case does involve two
adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.
Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government.").
84. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("[I]f a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as
it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.").
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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interest in criminalizing the conduct. 86 A variety of states facing challenges to
their antifornication statutes have asserted a number of interests in keeping such
laws on the books, such as preserving morality, protecting the public health, and
protecting the institution of marriage. These interests will be addressed in turn.
One common justification asserted by states in defense of antifornication
87laws is the state interest in preserving sexual morality. Proponents of sexual
conduct laws concede that these laws are rarely enforced but argue that this does
not mean such laws should be repealed. 88 One commentator has analogized lawsproscribing fornication and adultery to speeding laws:
Everybody breaks these laws, at least sometimes; but the laws are far
from pointless. They affect the time, manner, and mode of speeding; the
worst and most blatant offenders are caught and punished, while the
"ordinary" speeder gets away with his offense. Speeding laws almost
certainly cut down on the sheer amount of speeding; as a result,
speeding probably stays within roughly acceptable limits. The speeding
laws permit and foster a decent degree of control, while not interfering
with the God-given right to speed a little, some of the time.
89
Another commentator argues that the sporadic enforcement of sexual
conduct laws is perhaps the "most effective strategy for deterring consensual
conduct that violates a widely shared moral norm." 90 However, in a culture
where sex seems to be everywhere, it is questionable whether sexual morality is
in fact a widely shared norm. 91 The crux of the argument seems to be that, as
86. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (noting that criminalizing
family living arrangements is an "intrusive regulation... [, and] the usual judicial deference to the
legislature is inappropriate"). Additionally, the rational basis test, which is the most deferential test
to government that the Supreme Court uses in evaluating laws allegedly violating the Due Process
Clause, requires that the challenged classification be a rational means of achieving a legitimate
government interest. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
87. See Benjamin J. Cooper, Loose Not the Floodgates, 10 CARDozo WOMEN'S L.J. 311,
317 (2004) ("It is in the realm of moral guilt that sexual conduct laws do most good, as they protect
one's ability to choose one's sexual encounters free of external pressure."); see also Hoke v. United
States, 227 U.S. 308, 321 (1913) ("There is unquestionably a control in the States over the morals of
their citizens .... "); Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (1 1th Cir. 2001) ("The State's interest in
public morality is a legitimate interest .... The crafting and safeguarding of public morality has
long been an established part of the States' plenary police power to legislate and indisputably is a
legitimate government interest under rational basis scrutiny.").
88. See Cooper, supra note 87, at 313-14.
89. Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in
Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1093, 1102 (2002).
90. Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54 RUTGERS L. REV.
423,426 (2002).
91. Additionally, it is important to note that other commentators argue that sporadic
enforcement of such laws is a problem in and of itself. See Leslie, supra note 23, at 104 ("[A]
criminal law that is not enforced through prosecutions can still cause insidious social and legal
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with speeders, the police cannot catch every possible fornicator, but
antifomication laws serve the same purpose as the speed limits by reducing such
behavior to an "acceptable" level. However, this argument misses several
important points. First, speeding is not a "God-given right." States are given
great latitude in regulating their public highways and thoroughfares, and there is
93no question that speed limits are constitutional. Law enforcement officials may
enforce the speed limits as vigorously as they want, which suggests that, rather
than being a right, occasional speeding occurs because not all offenders get
caught. The speeding scenario stands in sharp contrast to the enforcement of
sexual conduct laws. Private sexual conduct usually occurs in the home, an area
where the Supreme Court has been particularly vigilant in protecting individual
liberty.94 Additionally, as discussed above, intimate sexual conduct implicates
the right to privacy recognized by the Court, and most sexual conduct laws are95
rarely enforced. In contrast, law enforcement regularly enforces speeding laws.
Thus, analogizing antifornication laws with speed limits is disingenuous, and the
supposed deterrence accomplished by sexual conduct laws like South Carolina's
antifomication statute is speculative at most.96 While states such as South
Carolina justify their antifornication and other similar laws as an effort to
preserve sexual morality, it is questionable whether these attempts actually
accomplish anything.
Another objective asserted by states defending laws similar to South
Carolina's antifornication laws is the interest in public health.97 The argument
consequences. The primary impact is symbolic: nominally unenforced laws are used to classify
groups and stigmatize common behavior.").
92. See Friedman, supra note 89, at 1102; cf PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MORALS 13 (1965) ("There is disintegration when no common morality is observed and history
shows that the loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of disintegration, so that society is
justified in taking the same steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its government and
other essential institutions.").
93. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 663 (1981) ("[T]he Court
normally accords 'special deference' to a state legislature's judgment in enacting highway
regulations." (quoting Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1978))).
94. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment draws a
'firm line at the entrance to the house.' That line, we think, must be not only firm but also
bright .... (citation omitted) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980))).
95. See supra Part 11.
96. See Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and
Extramarital Sex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1667-68 (1991) ("Although [antifomication] laws have
a long history, so does society's toleration of premarital sex. Current legislative and social attitudes
toward premarital intercourse also are relevant to a 'historical protection' analysis. The repeal of
fornication laws by numerous states, the enactment of noncoercive measures designed to permit
informed sexual choices, and the emerging consensus that premarital intercourse is a private and
permissible activity, indicate that an 'evolving standard of decency' constitutionally safeguards
fornication from governmental control." (footnotes omitted) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 330-31 (1989))).
97. See State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 341 (N.J. 1977).
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has been made in the context of contraception cases,98 and states have also cited
the prevention of teenage pregnancy and venereal diseases in defending their
antifornication statutes. 99 With respect to sodomy statutes in particular, some
argue that the concern is reducing the spread of HIV.1 °° It is well established that
"efforts to protect public health and safety" are within a state or municipality's
police powers, 10 1 and if sexual conduct laws actually do promote this objective,
one can make a strong argument that such laws are a proper exercise of states'
police powers. The Texas Physicians Resource Council, Christian Medical and
Dental Associations, and Catholic Medical Association have noted the
following:
The incidence and prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases have
grown exponentially since the sexual revolution of the 1960's and
1970's. The Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") estimates that "more
than 65 million [Americans] are currently living with an incurable
sexually transmitted disease (STD). An additional 15 million people
become infected with one or more STDS each year, roughly half of
whom contract lifelong infections." As the CDC noted in its most recent
STD surveillance report, "'[a]ll Americans have an interest in STD
prevention because all communities are impacted by STDs and all
98. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
99. See Saunders, 381 A.2d at 341. The Supreme Court has held that preventing teenage
pregnancy is a legitimate government interest. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470
(1981). In upholding the constitutionality of California's statutory rape law, the Court gave
deference to the California Supreme Court's opinion that the state legislature enacted the law in
order "to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies." Id.
100. See Brief in Support of Respondent on Behalf of Amici Curiae Texas Physicians
Resource Council, et al., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 367566,
at *2, *16 (arguing that the Court should uphold Texas's antisodomy law because the State has a
"legitimate interest in regulating public health" and that "[w]ith the emergence of AIDS and
identification of HLV, unprotected anal intercourse was reported to be the most efficient mode of
sexual transmission of HIV infection" (internal quotation marks omitted)); CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, 1l1V AND AIDS AMONG GAY AND BISEXUAL MEN 1 (2010), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/Newsroom/docs/FastFacts-MSM-FINAL508COMP.pdf ("MSM
[men who have sex with men] account for nearly half of the more than one million people living
with HLV in the U.S .... MSM account for more than half of all new HLV infections in the U.S.
each year .... [T]he rate of new HV diagnoses among MSM in the U.S. is more than 44 times that
of other men .... MSM is the only risk group in the U.S. in which new HIV infections are
increasing.").
101. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) ("The traditional police power of the States is
defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals, and we have upheld
such a basis for legislation.").
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individuals directly or indirectly pay for the costs of these diseases.
STDs are public health problems... ,,,102
While there have been numerous studies conducted showing the correlation
between unprotected sexual activity and the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases-a problem the government is legitimately concerned with curtailing-
no empirical evidence showing a correlation between preventing the spread of
STDs and antifornication or antisodomy laws was found during the research of
this Note. Thus, while states clearly have a legitimate interest in public health, it
is unclear and indeed debated whether criminalizing consensual sexual conduct
actually serves that interest.
Defenders of sexual conduct laws also point to the need to protect the
institution of marriage as a "compelling" justification. 103 The argument is that
marriage traditionally has served to regulate sexual behavior and that
"[r]eserving sex to married couples [has] served public functions." 10 4 Supporters
argue that antifomication and antiadultery laws protect children and that they
promote trust within the marriage itself.10 5 The fear is that removing restrictions
on sexual conduct will threaten marriage because, "[t]o strike them ... from the
books, is to take away opprobrium and let people do as they will without
guilt. '10 6 Unfortunately, similar to the public health argument, there is little, if
any, empirical data available showing a strong correlation between sexual
conduct laws and protecting marriage as an institution. In general, these
arguments seem to be based more on speculation and are grounded in neither
factual data nor constitutional provisions.
V. WHY CRIMINAL ANTIFORNICATION LAWS ARE PROBLEMATIC
As a general matter, imposing the majority's view of morality onto society
through the criminal law is problematic and inappropriate.10 7 In his dissenting
opinion in Bowers, Justice Blackmun noted the following:
That certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn the
behavior at issue gives the State no license to impose their judgments on
the entire citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation depends
102. Brief in Support of Respondent, supra note 100, at *7 (alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted) (citations omitted).
103. Cooper, supra note 87, at 315.
104. Val D. Ricks, Marriage and the Constitutional Right to Free Sex: The State Marriage
Amendments as Response, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 271, 272 (2005).
105. Id.; see also Cooper, supra note 87, at 315 ("The existence of stable coupling in America
correlates to America's prosperity and security, especially in the upbringing of intelligent, moral
citizens." (footnote omitted)).
106. Cooper, supra note 87, at 316.
107. This is especially true where it is unclear or debated as to how the majority views a
particular moral issue.
[VOL. 61 : 799
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol61/iss4/6
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
instead on whether the State can advance some justification for its law
beyond its conformity to religious doctrine.
10
8
While proponents of morality laws argue that morality in and of itself is a
legitimate basis for criminalizing conduct, Supreme Court cases prior to the
Lawrence decision overturned legislative enactments that sought to impose a
particular moral view onto society without some other legitimate justification. 109
Furthermore, vigorous enforcement of statutes such as South Carolina's
antifornication laws would involve constitutionally problematic methods. If
South Carolina were to decide to start systematically enforcing its antifornication
law, doing so would present several challenges. Because the sexual activity
sought to be punished largely occurs in private dwellings, absent exceptional
circumstances, police would need to obtain search warrants to enter homes in
order to arrest "perpetrators" and to gather evidence. Therein lies the problem.
The United States Constitution and the South Carolina Constitution both require
that a neutral magistrate issue a search warrant based on probable cause before
the government can enter a citizen's home. 110 In South Carolina, "[t]he General
Assembly has imposed stricter requirements than federal law for issuing a search
warrant.... [T]he South Carolina Code mandates that a search warrant 'shall be
issued only upon affidavit sworn to before the magistrate." '1 11 How are police
going to obtain the necessary evidence to support a finding of probable cause
when the "crime" occurs within the parameters of the home? Law enforcement
could perhaps rely on other evidence, such as evidence obtained from
informants, but doing so would invite the problem of selective enforcement and
discrimination.
Underenforced laws also raise problems by giving police too much
discretion. 112 Where law enforcement officials have great discretion, the
108. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Justice Blackmun further elaborated, "A State can no
more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior
because of racial animus. 'The Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect."' Id. at 211-12 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
109. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-36 (1996) (striking down Colorado
constitutional provision that allowed discrimination based on sexual orientation as violating equal
protection).
110. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; State v. Bellamy, 336 S.C. 140,
143, 519 S.E.2d 347, 348 (1999) ("A search warrant may issue only upon a finding of probable
cause." (citing State v. Owen, 275 S.C. 586, 588, 274 S.E.2d 510, 511 (1981))).
111. State v. Gentile, 373 S.C. 506, 513, 646 S.E.2d 171, 174 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-13-140 (1985)).
112. See Leslie, supra note 23, at 130 ("Although all laws vest police and prosecutors with
some degree of discretion, the vagueness of sodomy and related laws increases this discretion,
thereby allowing police to exercise their prejudices. Police have discretion over whom to target and
how to target .... Judge Posner has explained that underenforced sodomy laws 'vest enforcement
officials with enormous discretion, which invites discriminatory enforcement."' (footnote omitted)
(quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 207 (1992))).
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potential for selective enforcement becomes much greater. 113 While it has been
estimated that more than 90% of ever-married men and 80% of ever-married
women have had premarital sex by the age of nineteen, 114 enforcement of
antifornication laws against most individuals is limited.1 15 Nevertheless, "[g]iven
the prevalence of premarital sex, these statutes permit discriminatory arrests and
prosecutions. Fornication laws are used most often against suspected prostitutes,
rapists, and other criminals. Such discriminatory enforcement only makes the
continuing presence of fornication laws more indefensible."'1 16 These laws also
carry with them indirect consequences, which are troublesome given the
potential for discriminatory enforcement. 117 Additionally, it is a misconception
that underenforced and unenforced criminal laws, even those that carry minimal
sentences, are without consequence. As Justice Kennedy noted in Lawrence,
"[t]he stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial. The offense,
to be sure, is but a class C misdemeanor, a minor offense in the Texas legal
system. Still, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of
the persons charged."'118
VI. OVERTURNING ANTIFORNICATION STATUTES-TIE EXPERIENCES OF OTHER
STATES
While some state supreme courts have struck down antifornication laws,
other state legislatures have chosen to repeal their antifornication statutes. 119 For
example, Alabama chose to repeal its fornication prohibition based on its
reasoning that "[c]riminal sanctions are practically inadequate and, therefore,
inappropriate to regulate nondeviant sexual behavior between consenting,,120
unmarried adults. In Georgia, the state supreme court chose to deal with the
right to privacy in the context of sexual activity through its opinion in Powell v.
State.121 There, five years prior to the Lawrence decision, the Georgia Supreme
Court held that a Georgia sodomy statute violated the right of privacy as
113. See Note, supra note 96, at 1661-62.
114. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Key Statistics from the National Survey
of Family Growth, http://www.ede.gov/nchs/nsfg/abc listsp.htm#premarital (last visited May 14,
2010).
115. See Note, supra note 96, at 1661.
116. Id. at 1661-62 (footnotes omitted).
117. See id. at 1662-63 ("Even if fornication statutes were never enforced, their mere
existence would have a detrimental legal effect. Because premarital sex is a crime, several states
prohibit cohabitation between members of opposite genders, abridge the rights of individuals
charged with other sex-related crimes, and permit the jobs and children of fornicators to be taken
away. These 'incidental' consequences of fornication laws-often more burdensome than the
statutes-are the moral and constitutional equivalent of laws that would prohibit welfare payments
to unwed mothers as punishment for engaging in premarital sex." (footnotes omitted)).
118. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
119. See Ricks, supra note 104, at 282-83.
120. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 cmt. (LexisNexis 2005).
121. 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
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guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Georgia Constitution. 122 Looking to
a prior Georgia case, Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,123 Georgia's
highest court noted that the "'right of personal liberty' . . . embraces '[t]he right
to withdraw from the public gaze at such times as a person may see fit, when his
presence in public is not demanded by any rule of law."'' 124 In a footnote, the
court further noted that the right of people to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment implies "recognition of the existence
of a right of privacy.,
125
Under the South Carolina Constitution, there is a provision similar to the text
of the Fourth Amendment entitled "Searches and seizures; invasion of
privacy., 126 Following the reasoning of the Georgia Supreme Court in Powell, it
would seem that based on the "invasion of privacy" language in South Carolina's
Constitution, a right to privacy could be implied under South Carolina law as
well. 127 The experience of Georgia and other states where the courts overturned
similar laws suggests that doing away with antifornication laws will not have
disastrous effects.
In Commonwealth v. Wasson,128 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a
state statute criminalizing consensual homosexual activity violated the Kentucky
Constitution's equal protection and individual liberty guarantees.1 29 While the
court noted that the United States Supreme Court in Bowers held that the right of
privacy under the federal Constitution did not encompass a right to engage in
homosexual sodomy, it nonetheless held that the Kentucky Constitution more
broadly protects individual liberty against government intrusion than the federal
Constitution.13  Applying its understanding of the right to privacy to the
challenged statute, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that simply because
122. Id. at 26.
123. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
124. Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 22 (alteration in original) (quoting Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70).
125. Id. n.2 (quoting Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 71-72) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Compare S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions
of privacy shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or thing to be
seized, and the information to be obtained."), with U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.").
127. It is important to note, however, that the Georgia Supreme Court expressly indicated that
the right of privacy under the federal Constitution was not an issue in the case, Powell, 510 S.E.2d
at 21 n.1, and observed that "this Court [is] a pioneer in the realm of the right of privacy." Id. at 21
(citing Bodrey v. Cape, 172 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)).
128. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
129. Id. at 491-92.
130. Id. at 493-94. The Kentucky Supreme Court observed that "[t]he right of privacy has
been recognized as an integral part of the guarantee of liberty in our 1891 Kentucky Constitution
since its inception." Id. at 495.
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a majority in the state "finds one type of extramarital intercourse more offensive
than another, does not provide a rational basis for criminalizing the sexual
preference of homosexuals." 131
Similarly, in Campbell v. Sundquist,132 the Tennessee Court of Appeals
considered a challenge to the state's Homosexual Practices Act (TPA),133 a
statute similar to the statute overturned by the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Wasson. Although the plaintiffs in Campbell were never prosecuted under the
HPA, they sought a declaratory judgment that the HPA violated a right to
privacy under the Tennessee Constitution. 134 Like the Commonwealth of
Kentucky in Wasson, the State of Tennessee relied heavily on Bowers defending
the HPA, but the Tennessee Court of Appeals, quoting that state's supreme
court, noted that "'there is no reason to assume that there is a complete
congruency' between the federal and Tennessee rights to privacy." 135 Although
the court noted that the state constitution does not expressly mention a right to
privacy, it recognized such a right based on the language and development of the
Tennessee Constitution and described the right as one of personal autonomy or
"'the right to be let alone."'' 136 The court also discussed the state's police power
in the context of morals regulation and noted that "'the police power should
properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to be free from
interference in defining and pursuing his own morality but not to enforce a
majority morality on persons whose conduct does not harm others.' ' 137 Thus the
court in Campbell concluded that a Tennessee citizen's fundamental right to
privacy includes the right to engage in private, consensual sexual activity
because such conduct inherently involves private and intimate issues of personal
138concern.
Another state case involving a criminal statute prohibiting same-gender
sexual conduct was the decision in Gryczan v. State,139 where the Montana
Supreme Court held a deviate sexual conduct statute unconstitutional. 14 As in
the Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee cases, Montana's highest court
recognized a state constitutional right of individual privacy upon which the
challenged statute impermissibly infringed. 141 Additionally, while the State
attempted to justify the statute on the basis of a public health interest, the
Montana Supreme Court found that infringement onto fundamental privacy
131. Id. at 502.
132. 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), abrogated by Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan,
263 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2008).
133. See id. at 253 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 259 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992)).
136. Id. at 260 (quoting Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600).
137. Id. at 265 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980)).
138. Id. at 266.
139. 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997).
140. Id. at 126.
141. Id.
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rights could be warranted only where the State has a compelling interest, and in
this case, the State's goal did not constitute such a compelling interest.
142
Moreover, the State could not sustain its statute on the grounds that it had an
interest in protecting sexual morality.
143
The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Jegley v. Picado144 is also
illustrative of states recognizing a right to privacy in the context of sexual
activities prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence.145 Unlike the
Montana Constitution, the Arkansas Constitution does not expressly recognize a
fundamental right to privacy, 146 but the Arkansas Supreme Court nevertheless
held such a right to be implicit. 147 Because the court could conceive of instances
in which the challenged sodomy statute might constitutionally punish certain
conduct, such as the prohibition against sexual conduct involving animals, the
court held the statute to be facially constitutional. 148 However, the court held that
the statute violated a citizen's right to privacy on the basis of an "as applied"
challenge.149 While the court agreed that "the State has a clear and proper role to
protect the public from offensive displays of sexual behavior, to protect people
from forcible sexual contact, and to protect minors from sexual abuse by adults,"
142. See id. at 123 ("The State's assertion that the statute protects public health by containing
the spread of AIDS relies on faulty logic and invalid assumptions about the disease.... Despite the
two-plus decades that the statute has been in effect, HIV infection is currently a significant cause of
illness and death in this State .... ").
143. See id. at 125-26 ("The right of consenting adults, regardless of gender, to engage in
private, non-commercial sexual conduct strikes at the very core of Montana's constitutional right of
individual privacy; and, absent an interest more compelling than a legislative distaste of what is
perceived to be offensive and immoral sexual practices on the part of homosexuals, state regulation,
much less criminalization, of this most intimate social relationship will not withstand constitutional
scrutiny.").
144. 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002).
145. See id. at 334.
146. Compare MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to the
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest."), with Jegley, 80 S.W.3d at 346 ("No right to privacy is specifically enumerated in the
Arkansas Constitution.").
147. Jegley, 80 S.W.2d at 346-350. After a comprehensive review of Arkansas law, the court
stated, "In considering our constitution together with the statutes, rules, and case law mentioned
above, it is clear to this court that Arkansas has a rich and compelling tradition of protecting
individual privacy and that a fundamental right to privacy is implicit in the Arkansas Constitution."
Id. at 349-50. Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court held "that the fundamental right to privacy
implicit in our law protects all private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between
adults." Id. at 350.
148. Id. at 344.
149. Id. at 344, 350. The Arkansas Supreme Court noted that, at the time of its decision, nine
states had invalidated sodomy laws by judicial decision, including Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Id. at 345 n.4. On
the other hand, the court noted that as of 2002, nine states and Puerto Rico continued to maintain
statutes prohibiting sodomy among same-sex and opposite-sex individuals, including Alabama,
Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Utah, and
Virginia. Id.
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laws proscribing private, consensual sexual conduct between adults are unrelated
to the State's interest in these issues.
15 °
Finally, in 2005, in Martin v. Ziherl, the Virginia Supreme Court considered
a constitutional challenge to a statute criminalizing sexual intercourse between
two unmarried persons and determined that the law unconstitutionally infringed
upon the rights of adults to engage in private conduct in exercising their liberty
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 151 The court found
no principled distinction between the facts it faced and the facts the United
States Supreme Court confronted in Lawrence, and reasoned that "but for the
nature of the sexual act, the provisions of [Virginia] Code § 18.2-344 are
identical to those of the Texas statute. 152 Both statutes were attempts by the
state legislatures to control liberty interests that individuals exercise in making
decisions about their personal relationships.1 53 Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court
held that because the Court in Lawrence indicated that the federal
"[C]onstitution protects the liberty interests of persons to maintain a personal
relationship 'in the confines of their homes and their own private lives' and that
an element of that relationship is its 'overt expression in intimate conduct,"' the
Virginia statute could not withstand constitutional attack.154 While the decision
in Martin obviously does not control in South Carolina, it is interesting to note
that the Virginia Supreme Court expressly pointed out that Lawrence's
observation-that the challenged Texas statute furthered no legitimate state
interest justifying its intrusion into an individual's personal and private life-
extends beyond the interests Texas argued to support its statute; indeed, this
observation implicated "all manner of states' interests.1 5 5
VII. CONCLUSION
Because South Carolina Code Section 16-15-60 impermissibly intrudes into
a realm of individual privacy recognized and protected by the Supreme Court,
156
it is facially unconstitutional and should be repealed. Additionally, the South
150. Id. at 353. Thus, the court noted the following:
In conclusion, appellant has not offered sufficient reasoning to show that notions of a
public morality justify the prohibition of consensual, private intimate behavior between
persons of the same sex in the name of the public interest. There is no contention that
same-sex sodomy implicates the public health or welfare, the efficient administration of
government, the economy, the citizenry, or the promotion of the family unit. We have
consistently held that legislation must bear a real or substantial relationship to the
protection of public health, safety and welfare, in order that personal rights and property
rights not be subjected to arbitrary or oppressive, rather than reasonable, invasion.
Id.
151. See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 369, 371 (Va. 2005).
152. Id. at 370 & n.*.
153. See id. at 370-71.
154. Id. at 369, 371 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
155. Id. at 370.
156. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
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Carolina Constitution, though not expressly recognizing a right to privacy,
contains a due process provision nearly identical to the Fourteenth Amendment,
from which such a right can be inferred. 157 Recognizing that the right to privacy
encompasses private consensual adult sexual activity does not necessarily mean
that all morality-based legislation would be subject to constitutional challenge,
158which is what Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence predicts. Rather, there are
meaningful differences between laws prohibiting fornication and laws
prohibiting other conduct such as child pornography, obscenity, and
prostitution. 159 Even though Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence suggests
that moral disapproval is not a legitimate basis for legislation (and thus may fail
even rational basis review),160 other laws grounded in society's moral choices
could withstand attack on other grounds. With respect to South Carolina's
statutes, although the law proscribing fornication cannot be sustained, the law
proscribing buggery does not appear to be facially unconstitutional, because an
individual could face a conviction under that statute for committing sexual acts
with an animal. 162 However, when the statute is applied to consensual private
adult sexual conduct, it clearly runs afoul of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lawrence.
In Martin, in declaring a Virginia law criminalizing fornication to be
unconstitutional, the Virginia Supreme Court took care to point out "that this
case does not involve minors, non-consensual activity, prostitution, or public
activity," distinguishing the antifornication law on the basis that it was
unconstitutional because it impermissibly sought to regulate private sexual
157. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 3 ("The privileges and immunities of citizens of this State and of the
United States under this Constitution shall not be abridged, nor shall any person be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.").
158. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 212-13 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("This
case involves no real interference with the rights of others, for the mere knowledge that other
individuals do not adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable interest .
overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
160. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (finding that the majority may not use the State's power to
enforce its moral "views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law"); cf Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) ("Our obligation is to define the liberty of
all, not to mandate our own moral code.").
161. Cf Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353 (Ark. 2002) ("[T]he police power may not be
used to enforce a majority morality on persons whose conduct does not harm others."). Although
the court in Jegley held that the law as applied was an unconstitutional infringement of the
individual right to privacy, the court did not strike down the challenged statute as facially
unconstitutional because the statute also prohibited sexual conduct involving humans and animals, a
permissible use of the state's police power. Id. at 344, 350.
162. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (2003). In 2009, a South Carolina man was charged
with buggery for having sex with a horse in Horry County. See Kurt Knapek, Sex with Horse? S.C.
Man Charged 2nd Time, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 29, 2009, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/
2009/07/29/858947/sex-with-horse-sc-man-charged.html.
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activity between consenting adults. 163 Indeed, in Singson v. Commonwealth,
164
the Virginia Court of Appeals declined to extend Martin in the context of a
challenge to the state's antisodomy statute where the law "prohibits individuals
from engaging in public acts of sodomy." 165 The court noted that the challenges
in Bowers and Lawrence involved as-applied challenges rather than facial
challenges, and thus there could be some permissible applications of antisodomy
laws. 16If the South Carolina Supreme Court were to hear a challenge to its
antibuggery statute, it could take a similar direction to that taken by the Virginia
Court of Appeals in Singson and the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v.
Whiteley167 and determine whether the statute was unconstitutional as applied
under the circumstances. 168 In Whiteley, the court found that a North Carolina
statute creating the offense of a crime against nature was unconstitutional as
applied to the facts of the case and vacated the defendant's sentence. 169 With
regard to criminal offenses punishing pedophilia, child pornography, and the
like, an additional (and more compelling) justification is the State's desire to
protect minors from predatory adults. The Supreme Court has on many occasions
recognized the government's interest in protecting children as a compelling
interest. 17 As to obscenity, prostitution, and public indecency offenses, these
laws can be distinguished from antifomication laws because the former laws
involve conduct that is inherently public and may offend other members of
163. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371 (Va. 2005).
164. 621 S.E.2d 682 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
165. Id. at 688.
166. See State v. Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d 576, 580 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) ("[O]ur state's
regulation of sexual conduct falling outside the narrow liberty interest recognized in Lawrence
remains constitutional."); Singson, 621 S.E.2d at 688 ("[B]ecause Singson's proposed conduct
occurred in a public location, application of Code § 18.2-361 ...does not implicate Singson's
constitutionally-protected right to engage in private, consensual acts of sodomy.").
167. 616 S.E.2d 576 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
168. See Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 580; Singson, 621 S.E.2d at 688.
169. Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 581-83. In that case, the "[d]efendant was charged with first
degree rape, first degree sexual offense, and a crime against nature." Id. at 578. A jury found the
defendant not guilty of rape or sexual offense but returned a guilty verdict as to the crime against
nature. Id. The court noted that the state statute remained constitutional following the Supreme
Court's decision in Lawrence because "state regulation of sexual conduct involving minors, non-
consensual or coercive conduct, public conduct, and prostitution falls outside the boundaries of the
liberty interest protecting personal relations." Id. at 580. However, the court vacated the defendant's
conviction because the court found the statute under which he was convicted unconstitutional
"when used to criminalize acts within private relations protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest." Id. at 581. Because the trial judge charged the jury that the defendant was guilty if
he 'committed an unnatural sexual act"' but did not instruct the jury as to the victim's consent, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals found the statute unconstitutional as applied. Id.
170. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869-70 (1997) (recognizing a compelling state
interest in protecting minors). Although the Court in Reno found the federal law unconstitutional,
the Court nevertheless recognized that protecting minor children is a compelling state interest. Id. at
849, 869-70.
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society, thereby intruding on their rights.171 Private sexual activity that is truly
consensual and that occurs between adults, however, does not interfere with the
rights of others, and various courts upholding laws regulating sexual activity
have made this distinction.172 While "[a] legitimate state interest clearly exists in
regulating conduct involving minors, non-consensual or coercive conduct, public
conduct, and prostitution,, 173 the decision in Lawrence indicates that regulation
of particular sexual acts is impermissible when the regulation intrudes upon
personal and intimate relations with no legitimate state interest. 174 Society as a
whole may have an interest in sexual morality, but it is difficult to see how that
interest should override the liberty interests of individual adults who are
engaging in what they have decided is acceptable private conduct. The Supreme
Court has held far more publicly disruptive activities to be constitutionally
protected.
175
Marghretta Adeline Hagood
171. Note, however, that the Supreme Court has protected the right of individuals to possess
obscene materials within the privacy of the home. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-68
(1969) (overturning the defendant's criminal conviction for possession of obscene materials and
holding that the government "cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of
controlling a person's private thoughts").
172. See, e.g., Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
where consent is in doubt, the State has a legitimate interest to interpose, which is unaffected by
Lawrence's recognition of a right of "individuals to engage in fully and mutually consensual private
sexual conduct"); People v. Williams, 811 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (noting that the
Lawrence decision expressly excludes prostitution from its holding); State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d
1233, 1238 (La. 2005) (declining to declare a Louisiana law criminalizing solicitation to engage in a
crime against nature for compensation as unconstitutional even after Lawrence).
173. Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 580-81.
174. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
175. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion) ("The act of
burning a cross may mean that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation.
But that same act may mean only that the person is engaged in core political speech."); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (overturning the defendant's criminal conviction for burning the
American flag during a protest rally because the First Amendment protects such expressive content
and finding that the State's asserted interests in preventing a breach of the peace and preserving the
American flag as a symbol of unity and nationhood were insufficient to justify criminally
prosecuting the defendant); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519, 528 (1972) (holding that a
Georgia law, which provided that "[a]ny person who shall, without provocation, use to or of
another, and in his presence... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach
of the peace ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor" was on its face unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad where the Georgia courts had not narrowly interpreted the statute).
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